Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 47
Number 1 Teaching Civil Procedure (Winter
2003)

Article 7

1-15-2003

A Parting Reprise
Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman
University of Houston Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lonny S. Hoffman, A Parting Reprise, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. (2003).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol47/iss1/7

This Approaches to Teaching Civil Procedure is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship
Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A PARTING REPRISE

LONNY SHEINKOPF HOFFMAN*
It is hard to imagine the semester is already at an end. Finals are just
around the corner. Before long, you will be through your second and third
years of law school and, thereafter, to lives as lawyers. Less than fifteen weeks
ago our journey together began. We have covered much terrain since then, you
and I; and yet, in perspective, what a short and fleeting span. Is it not
presumptuous of me to think of having accomplished with you anything
substantial, to say nothing of having made an indelible mark on your education
and training? Still, in even less time, Lawrence managed to cross the Nefud
desert and lead disparate tribal bands to successful revolt against the Turkish
army in Aqaba. Our conquests have been less grandiose—less cinematic, to be
sure—but still I say conquests we have made. After having come this far, we
are entitled to sit back and reflect on the journey taken.
Between now and the time you enter the world as lawyers, there is twice as
much schooling still before you to complete. Yet, in many respects, you have
already taken the first and most difficult step. You have begun to lay a
foundation for how to approach the law: intellectually, professionally and
ethically. As your teacher, it is my hope that you will remember some of the
lessons I intended to impart. What teacher does not wish it to be so! In the
maddening rush through your first semester of law school, though, I fear you
may have been distracted at times by what must have felt like a wild footrace
to keep up with the course reading, by the demands of your other classes,
and—dare I say—even of your own personal lives (yes, the world outside of
school defiantly continued turning, unabated by your recent anointment as
first-year law students). I want to take this opportunity, then, to spend a little
time summarizing what I sought to accomplish in the course and what it is I
would like you to take away from this experience. If I have done my job well,

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. For their thoughtful comments
on earlier drafts of this essay, I thank Peter Linzer, John Mixon, Jennifer Rosato, Richard Saver,
Michael Solimine and Leigh Van Horn. I am also indebted to several former students, Ed
Berbarie, Damon Karam, Sharon Fast, Meghan Griffiths, Katherine Howard, Patrick Kemp,
Kristin Lanoue, Lance Leisure and Jason Starks, for sharing their views about the course in Civil
Procedure. Finally, I reserve special thanks to Laura Sheinkopf and Bobbi Samuels; their
influences on my teaching are beyond measure. The University of Houston Foundation provided
financial support for this project.
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then much of what I am about to say will sound unnecessary and transparent,
like I am clubbing you over the head with lessons already assimilated.
As I endeavored to stress from the outset, a single theme characterizes my
pedagogic choices in organizing this course. That theme is that the most
exciting, effective, and enriching way for me to teach the first-year class in
Civil Procedure is to teach “by example.” It is a concept with three different,
but associated, meanings.
Teaching by example signifies that I place little emphasis on rote
memorization of rules and doctrines, preferring instead to focus on how the
law actually works. Acquiring knowledge of written law (that is, in the sense
of the open-a-book-and-find-it variety) is a part of what is required of your
legal studies, but it is only one part. Beyond knowledge, there is
comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis and evaluation.1 To encourage
you toward more constructive and advanced learning, we worked with concrete
exercises and hypothetical problems as a complement to our reading. By
placing the law of procedure into a problem-oriented learning process, you
were exposed to authentic examples of legal decision-making and asked,
thereby, to respond to the material by thinking about law as lawyers must.
Teaching by example also means that I focus on a smaller number of
subjects in procedure—that is, on a few examples of the law of procedure—
rather than try to expose you to a smorgasbord of topics, not a single one of
which you know in any detail or for which you have any appreciation of its
true complexities. Through careful consideration and rigorous dissection of
the material we do cover, my aim is for you to begin to acquire independent
tools of legal reasoning that you may then apply on other occasions. Broadly
stated, I seek to train and encourage you to think through and assess legal
questions on your own and to help you construct a well deep with selfsustaining analytic abilities from which you will be able to draw for years and
years to come.
The third, and last, respect in which I invoke teaching by example is as
shorthand for saying that this course is concerned not only with the “law of
procedure,” but also with emphasizing and identifying the ethical boundaries
and context in which legal problems and issues necessarily arise. The
technical term for this is teaching ethical norms through the pervasive method.2
1. See TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: THE CLASSIFICATION OF
EDUCATIONAL GOALS: HANDBOOK I, COGNITIVE DOMAIN (Benjamin S. Bloom et al. eds., 1956)
(classifying different degrees or levels of intellectual tasks relevant in learning); see also DONALD
H. JONASSEN ET AL., HANDBOOK OF TASK ANALYSIS PROCEDURES, ch. 12 (1989) (discussing
“Bloom’s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives”).
2. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD, at xxix (1994) (observing that “[p]rofessional responsibility questions should be
addressed in all substantive courses because they arise in all substantive fields, and because their
resolution implicates values that are central to lawyers’ personal and professional lives”).
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In plainer English, it means I do not believe it wise to teach a subject as
powerful and as potent as Civil Procedure without trying to install some sense
of the professional responsibilities that ought to flow from its embrace.
TEACHING BY EXAMPLE STRESSES ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OVER
MEMORIZATION OF RULES AND DOCTRINES
The first sense in which I mean I teach by example is that I value studying
cases and problems not because they are vehicles for memorizing legal rules
and doctrine, but because they can be used to introduce you to the kind of
rigorous cognitive exercises in which all good lawyers must engage. Rather
than working exclusively from the cases, statutes and rules contained in our
casebook, we wrestled with hypothetical problems and exercises throughout
the semester as a supplement to and overall framework for our studies. The
goal was to have you not just think abstractly and passively about a legal issue
or a set of facts, but to push you to create something tangible: draft a pleading,
frame a request for relief, lodge an objection, or make an argument. My
objective, thus, was to encourage you toward active learning—toward the
constitution of the tangible. The end product of your study became something
you could pick up and hold in your hand and in your mind; something you
could turn over and critique, analyze, assess and improve upon; something
more than just a summary you read about what someone else had done.
I have found that students do not come to this style of learning easily or
with much enthusiasm. Conventional teaching, as typified by the lecturing
model, is based on the idea that teachers impart knowledge into empty,
expectant vessels waiting passively to be filled. Having been conditioned to
accept this traditional form of educational instruction, what Paulo Freire and
bell hooks have called the “banking system of education,”3 most of the vessels
find the traditional pedagogic approach unthreatening. In law school, the
belief that course material can be imparted through straightforward recitation
of the law comports jurisprudentially with a formalist view of our legal system.
For formalists, rules and doctrines are assumed to be definite and
ascertainable.4 As a result, the lecturing style of teaching fits comfortably with
a formalist approach to teaching law that assumes there are answers to be
gleaned and conveyed from careful study of the relevant authorities; and
answers, especially for those who have just begun their studies in the field, are
welcome indeed.5

3. BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS: EDUCATION AS THE PRACTICE OF FREEDOM
5, 14 (1994).
4. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (discussing the rise of formalism in America in the latter part of the
nineteenth century).
5. Note that the “Socratic” style of teaching, usually associated with law school teaching,
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It must surely, then, have caused a great deal of anxiety for many of you
that this course always seemed woefully short of answers. Although those
early dog days of August may seem a distant memory now, think back to our
earliest classes and you may recall the confusion and uncertainty you felt then.
Consider, for instance, how we treated the subject of Rule 8’s pleading
requirements. After you had read some of the relevant cases, I asked you to
draft a complaint, based on the results of an in-class mock client interview we
had previously conducted. Your first reaction to all of the demands being
made on you to create and think, not merely to read and regurgitate, naturally
might have been: “I have no idea what should go into a complaint. I’m not a
lawyer. I’ve only just begun law school. Why can’t we see an example of
what a lawsuit should look like so that we can use it as a model for drafting
this one?”
I must confess these reactions were hardly unexpected. The question you
may be asking, then, is why did I insist on this exercise if I thought that many
or most of you would dislike it or be even further frustrated by it? My
explanation is thus: drafting a lawsuit forced you to wrestle with the actual
application of the case law you read to a particular fact pattern you had been
given, rather than just debating how close or how far any particular case was
from the standard promulgated by Rule 8 and as refined by common law
precedents. If I had asked you how much factual information needs to go into
a pleading to satisfy Rule 8, based on your reading of the Supreme Court’s
precedents in Conley v. Gibson,6 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics &
Coordination Unit,7 or of particularly important lower court decisions like
Judge Keeton’s in Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner,8 what kind of answer would
you have given? Indeed, is there an answer to this question in the abstract? By
insisting that you take the doctrinal background and apply it to a particular fact
pattern, you were forced to synthesize, as much as possible, the relevant
authorities. In the language of educational theory, you were being asked to
produce an authentic response to what you read about the law of procedure—

could just as easily as not be bottomed on a formalist view of law. One could prod students by
asking a series of questions about the material covered and still maintain that the law is definite
and ascertainable. Indeed, Christopher Columbus Langdell, the iconic image of formalism in the
law school classroom, was also the popularizer of the Socratic style of teaching at Harvard Law
School. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 170-74. Relating formalism to Socratic
technique may be merely an entirely academic exercise anyway, insofar as the most reliable
figures suggest that less than a third of professors teaching first-year courses rely primarily on the
Socratic method, while nearly 95% of those teaching upper level classes lecture, at least some of
the time, to their students. See Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching
Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (1996).
6. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
7. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
8. 768 F. Supp. 892 (D. Mass. 1991).
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that is, you were directed to act as lawyers must act when addressing legal
issues as they arise.
At the end of the exercise, most of you may not have fully digested the
lesson. Many, of course, still yearned for a definitive answer about pleading
and still urged that we pinpoint precisely how much detail must be included in
a complaint. But even as old habits and attitudes die hard, the process of
working through problems and trying your hand at drafting exercises—rather
than viewing the question only from the perspective of a dry appellate
record—slowly, but surely, began to make some sense. As the semester wore
on, more and more of you gradually became less and less uncomfortable with
the idea that we were not going to provide answers in class. Having
undertaken one exercise after another, the thought eventually began to
percolate around the room that there might be more than one right way to put
together the allegations of a lawsuit, or to draft discovery requests, or to
respond to a summary judgment motion, and on and on. You began to see that
there was no Answer, in the sense of some all-encompassing Truth, whether
we were talking about the requirements of notice pleading or most of the other
topics we addressed. There are boundaries to the law with which one must be
familiar, to be sure, but the rules rarely come in one-size-fits-all packages.
My preference for active learning and for framing the in-class conversation
around constructive understanding gained through application and analysis
over recitation of formal rules is hardly revolutionary. Long before I began
teaching, formalism’s once firm hold on law school classrooms already had
been thoroughly loosened.9 Today, it is surely right that most law professors
favor more nuanced approaches to legal study than Christopher Columbus
Langdell would have recognized or understood. Yet, if formalism’s heyday
has come and gone (as Jerome Frank10 and, more recently, Andrew Taslitz11
remind us), the ghost of our Langdellian past still haunts the modern law
classroom. How could it be otherwise? I have argued elsewhere that the
assumptions about law embodied in formalist thinking are firmly rooted into
our societal constructs about the rule of law in general and, to a large extent,
may be inherent in the essential base of legitimacy upon which our American
judicial system rests.12
In the context of the law school classroom, students certainly welcome the
traditional approach to legal study. They instinctively feel less threatened by
more straightforward recitation of the subject matter. From the instructor’s
9. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 4 (discussing the demise of formalism, and the role
of legal realism, law and economics, and critical legal studies).
10. See Jerome Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 20, 21 (1951).
11. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Exorcising Langdell’s Ghost: Structuring a Criminal Procedure
Casebook for How Lawyers Really Think, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 143, 143 (1991) (book review).
12. See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, A Window Into the Courts: Legal Process and
the 2000 Presidential Election, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1533 (2001) (book review).
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vantage point, teaching is not only made easier by reciting that which is
knowable and certain, but it also serves as a measure of academic validation.
“I am sir Oracle––and when I ope my mouth let no dog bark.”13 If I, as your
professor, lack some superior body of finite and complete knowledge
(something upon which I may profess), what claim do I have to the podium?
Answers––definite answers in the form of black and white rules and clear
doctrinal principles––are instant gratification to the newcomer and barometers
of accomplishment for the teacher. Formalism is dead; long live formalism.
As with much else in life, I think the more sensible view is to recognize
that the pedagogic debate about formalism and its place in legal pedagogy is a
matter of emphasis and degree. With other like-minded souls,14 I believe I
endeavor with greater fervor than most to move far away from a doctrinallycentered view of law. On the whole, I prefer application to answers; rigorous
thinking to rote recitation of authorities. One of the perceived costs of this
pedagogic orientation is that it engenders feelings among students of
uncertainty and indeterminacy, at least in the short run. The law never seems
settled with the rules pliable to the point of breaking. In practice, however, and
over the long run, I think you will find that the kind of intellectual efforts we
cultivated here will turn out to be the bread and butter of what you will be
asked to do for your own clients. Our in-class efforts were meant, in some
measure, to be a valuable practical experience and to provide a training ground
of sorts for your future work. By insisting on placing legal questions in a
concrete context, the main objective is to encourage students toward the kind
of active, applicative learning I think ought to be an integral component of the
legal education experience.
I have watched a handful of truly great lawyers represent their clients and,
without exception, all of them share at least one remarkable skill: the sage
ability to discern that in the hard cases it is usually the facts, and not the law,
that matter most. The law is never irrelevant, of course, but where there is a
legitimate dispute between two or more persons, the relevant rules serve only
to frame the context of the debate; by themselves, they do not predetermine
outcomes. Memorizing case holdings and legal doctrine will never lead you
closer to becoming a great lawyer; and while a successful career surely is not
defined solely by the ability to apply your knowledge of the facts of a
particular case to the relevant law and then to analyze wisely, these are,
nonetheless, essential traits that you must have if you are to be a valued
counselor and advocate for others.

13. K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 105 (1960).
14. See, e.g., Douglas L. Leslie, How Not to Teach Contracts, and Any Other Course:
Powerpoint, Laptops, and the CaseFile Method, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1289 (2000) (discussing his
CaseFile Method of study); see also EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
PROPERTY LAW (4th ed. 2000) (applying problem-based approach to property law casebook).
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TEACHING BY EXAMPLE EMPHASIZES CAREFUL ATTENTION TO DETAIL OVER
A BROAD SWEEP THROUGH AN ENTIRE FIELD
The second sense in which I have tried to teach this course by example is
by focusing in detail on a smaller number of subjects in procedure rather than
undertaking a broad sweeping coverage of the entire field. I have grand
ambitions here: to produce students capable of thinking on their own and,
thereafter, capable, thinking lawyers. The ambition is grand precisely because
it is all too often the case that law students are not trained in a manner that
encourages the development of independent reasoning ability. Students then
matriculate to the profession without having worked on strengthening this
essential skill set. Rigorous teaching can and does take place in law school but
the forum, more often than not, is a smaller setting than the first year, large
class experience (such as seminars, other small, intensively-focused classes
and independent study projects with faculty members). By the time students
take these courses, however, attitudes toward law and legal study largely have
been set. Eventually, experience in the workplace may fill the holes left by
formal legal education but the costs borne will have been substantial: for the
lawyer, for her employer and, most of all, for the client. To my mind, as
educators, we should strive in the very beginning of a student’s studies to
inspire good intellectual habits by singing of the vast riches that can be mined
from the development of keen analytic capabilities and from the cultivation of
a temperament willing to endure the hard, lonely work that careful and
rigorous study usually requires.
In consciously narrowing the number of procedure topics covered in the
course, I recognize I am inviting controversy from both students and
colleagues who may be concerned that an insufficient quantum of knowledge
is being imparted. If I am going to make a convincing case for my pedagogic
approach, then it is necessary to begin by recounting what was covered and
what was left out from the class, though from having sat through the course
you may already have some sense of the lacunas. Our syllabus provides a
summary of the topics we examined, broken down into the eight main subject
areas as they were addressed:
(i)

Pleadings and related issues (fair notice and special pleading
requirements; sanctions; answers and affirmative defenses;
amendments; counterclaims and cross claims);

(ii)

Personal jurisdiction and related issues (statutory and constitutional
limits on the exercise of territorial jurisdiction; notice and service of
process; venue and transfer; forum non conveniens);
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(iii)

Subject matter jurisdiction (diversity jurisdiction; federal question
jurisdiction; supplemental jurisdiction and removal);

(iv)

Choice of law (brief discussion of Erie);

(v)

Pretrial discovery (scope of discovery; written discovery;
depositions; initial disclosures and other timing issues;
responding/objecting to discovery; discovery disputes);

(vi)

Judgment as a matter of law;

(vii) Additional parties/claims; and
(viii) Preclusion law (brief discussion of general principles of res judicata
and collateral estoppel).
Even this list is misleading insofar as we did not devote equal attention to
all of these subject areas. Noticeably absent are several major topics that
nearly all procedure casebooks and—I suspect—a good number of my
procedure colleagues around the country do cover. Class actions and complex
litigation were omitted entirely. We never addressed the subject of
interpleader. The subject of prejudgment remedies was left out. We spent
virtually no time either on trial practice and procedure or on appellate
procedures, except as certain discrete subjects arose coincidentally with some
other part of our conversation. I have no doubt that this list of topics not
addressed surely could be expanded further and further. It is, quite clearly,
then, an incomplete list. By extension, has not your exposure to the subject of
Civil Procedure also been incomplete? Should you ask for your money back?
I have two answers to offer in defense of my pedagogic decision to focus
on depth over coverage, although I hasten to add that I regard the former as
less my reason for acting than is the latter.
I left off certain topics, not because I think they are unimportant, but rather
for the more pedestrian reason that most of you, over the course of your entire
careers, will either never come across these legal topics directly in practice, or
you will address them very, very infrequently. For my own part, I find
virtually the entire field of procedure fascinating. After this year is done, I
would be delighted to work with you, through independent study or as a
mentor on a law review note, regarding any of these or other topics. For those
who know they will need more in-depth coverage of a subject, I encourage
further exploration. If you are inclined toward banking law, then take our
banking law offerings and immerse yourself in the mud of interpleader actions
to your heart’s content. My own, best pedagogic judgment, however, is that
the topics we covered in class will arise most frequently in the practices of the
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vast majority of students—and here I have tried to keep in mind that this room
may be filled with as many future transactional lawyers as litigators—and that
it is a better service to concentrate our efforts on the issues most of you are
most likely to encounter.
There is a second answer I want to give to explain my pedagogic choice. It
is, as I indicated before, the more compelling motivation for my adoption of
this approach. Through my decision to focus on fewer topics in more detail, I
endeavor to challenge you to truly learn something, to digest an issue fully and
precisely so that you can draw upon your acquired skills in future study or
work. I choose this path instead of seeking to expose you to “everything”
related to procedure, as though that were even possible. I believe I have done
my job well if I succeed in producing students who are able to think and reason
through legal issues on their own, rather than merely attaining a passing
familiarity with a topic but no real sense or understanding of it. In short, my
guiding philosophy is that I care much more that you learn and how you learn
than about what you learn.
Educational theorists would describe this approach as pushing students
beyond the “zone of proximal development”; that is, beyond the level of
learning they could otherwise obtain on their own.15 Put another way, rather
than merely urging fluency in the vocabulary of the law, I believe that as a
teacher I ought to be asking, “What can I do to help students gain a more
lasting and deeper intellectual framework than they would otherwise possess if
they had not taken this course?” By teaching a smaller number of subjects in
greater detail, my firm pedagogic belief is that students will leave more
capable of applying their acquired legal acumen to any problem, whether the
particular issues were addressed specifically in one of their law school classes
or not.
I believe it bolsters the case for teaching procedure by example to say that
the subjects one could cover in this course, to a large degree, are fungible. I
have created my own list of must-cover topics. Other syllabi may look
somewhat, or even markedly, different than mine. Rather than regard these
differences as indictments, I view them as confirmations that the subject of
procedure is an excellent tool for teaching students how to think critically.
Because procedure cuts across the entire legal landscape, I am able to address
the entire class at once, without regard to whether you will become estate law
lawyers or tax lawyers, environmental lawyers or lawyers who specialize in
tort law. It also does not matter whether your career choice is litigation or
transactional work. Procedure is relevant to everyone. As a result, I can
employ any number of subjects falling under the general rubric of procedure to
aid in the development of the skills that are important to all students in
15. L. S. VYGOTSKY, MIND IN SOCIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER PSYCHOLOGICAL
PROCESSES 86-87 (Michael Cole et al. eds., 1978).
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becoming successful lawyers and critical thinkers. I could not do the same if I
were teaching an advanced course with a specific focus. It is precisely because
the contexts in which you will encounter procedural issues are so vast and so
innumerable, that I believe it makes little sense to try to pretend it is possible to
cover all subjects in the field. Instead, my role is to help sharpen the
intellectual tools that will serve you well in a number of different contexts.
There is time enough in later classes, and later in life, for you to become
familiar in detail with particular questions and points of law. This course and
law school, in general, are of most value if you are pushed to truly dissect a
problem, to turn it upside down, to examine it from every side and then,
finally, to carefully produce a thoughtful answer. This is a fundamental part of
real teaching and learning. By contrast, I do not comprehend how students are
served by wide, unfiltered sweeps through vast terrains. Even if the sole
measure is how many right answers to legal doctrinal questions will students
get after they have taken the final exam and moved on to other courses,
conventional law school teaching, particularly as found throughout the firstyear curriculum, usually disappoints.16
A Jewish fable recounts how a famous pianist once was asked how he
managed to be so adept in playing the musical notes. To the question, he
replied, “The notes I handle no better than many musicians, but the pauses
between the notes—ah! That is where the art resides.” In law, the pauses
between the notes may be likened to the exacting skill of knowing when and
how to slow down long enough to ponder a question more deeply than the
next. The rules that may apply to any one particular case are readily
ascertainable; any conscientious person ought to be able to find them, along
with the pertinent case law. But it is the student who has not merely
knowledge but a command of the law who is exceptional. Stand back! For
when you hand her the same rule book, the words may fly off the page. Watch
her wield the law, as a sharpened tool––no, better still, as a precisely tuned
instrument––to reach the desired result for her client. Having mastered this
rare ability, she is one of the few who is capable of recognizing and then
invoking the enormous power that lies within the formal rules.
TEACHING BY EXAMPLE EMPHASIZES THE ETHICAL CHOICES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES INVOLVED IN BEING A LAWYER
There is, finally, a third respect in which I have tried to teach Civil
Procedure by example. I have stressed that there is much more to being a
lawyer than merely knowing the law. There is also the challenge of
recognizing and then acting on one’s ethical obligations: to clients, to other
lawyers and to the judicial system.
16. See, e.g., Leslie, supra note 14, at 1293 (discussing results following pop quiz given to
students).
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One irreducible component of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities is to
treat people with respect and to honor the views, opinions and arguments of
others. In the classroom, I regard respect—both as a matter between teacher
and student and among students—as an essential element that must be
nurtured. In this regard, consider Leigh Van Horn’s description of how vibrant
educational environments are created and sustained at the secondary school
level in her book, Creating Literary Communities in the Middle School:
There must be more to my role in developing and sustaining the community
than my outward expressions of enthusiasm. The word “respect” is one that is
frequently used by my students as they describe aspects of teacher behavior
they consider important to their own growth. How is it that we show our
students that we have respect for them? It occurs to me that respect is reflected
in various ways––our willingness to participate in the learning experience as
we work alongside our students, the emphasis we place on learning from one
another, the way that we honor the products of our learning, and in the way
that we care for one another.17

I have long felt that law academia has much to learn from the scholarship of
teaching and education in other fields. Although we teach to different
students, and for different purposes, what we do is fundamentally no different,
in my estimation, than what any instructor must do to teach effectively. In my
law school classroom, creating an environment of mutual respect is paramount.
I never call on students to intimidate them. Rather, I do so to encourage
students to wrestle outside of class with the ideas, arguments and issues about
which they have read and to come prepared to defend a viewpoint (or, at least,
be able to articulate various sides of a debate). I recognize that it is a tricky
business at times, particularly since I want to encourage volunteers to answer
as well, and not set up a culture that only the person who is “on” should be
involved in the discussion. Moreover, it is obvious that some are not as keen
on speaking out in class as others.
I regard it, therefore, as one of the most rewarding compliments I have
received to be told that those who choose in other settings to be silent, out of
fear, intimidation, or merely disinterest, choose instead to come to my class
prepared and ready to engage in the daily classroom dialogue. This evidence
of the blossoming of mutual respect––as it occurs between teacher and
students, and among students––helps create the trust upon which a vibrant
learning community depends. And make no mistake, the yield that is produced
by the fostering of a healthy and dynamic learning environment truly should be
valued at a price far above rubies. Students come prepared to converse, argue
and debate, but also with a willingness to consider and listen to the viewpoints
of others. Class discussions are made richer by having a greater and wider
17. LEIGH VAN HORN, CREATING LITERACY COMMUNITIES IN THE MIDDLE SCHOOL 18-19
(2001).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

54

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 47:43

degree of student participation. Best of all, the dialogue often does not travel
unilaterally merely from teacher to student and back again, but flows
multilaterally. A chart of many of our discussions would trace a path from
teacher to Student 1, then to Student 2, back to teacher, to Student 3, back to
Student 1, and so forth. In this more complex web of dialogue and discussion,
both individualized and collective learning experiences take root. As the
professor, I cannot ask for more.
Building on our classroom experiences, I emphasized throughout the
semester the importance of taking these lessons about respect and applying
them to thinking about your soon-to-be future lives as lawyers. The
responsibility of being a lawyer triggers professional obligations of decency,
honesty, promptness, diligence, and general professional courtesy to other
lawyers, to your clients, and to the judicial system. Some of these traits are
naturally self-enforcing. In seven years of trial practice, I rarely saw a lawyer
behave badly in court.
Like the unruly child in grade school,
unprofessionalism in lawyers tends to rear its ugly head only when the teacher
is not looking. Acting professionally should not depend upon whether there is
oversight, though. It should be instinctive and expected. Alas, we cannot
depend entirely on people doing the right thing only for the sake of doing the
right thing. As a result, there are punitive rules in place to deter malfeasance.
The extent to which they do so, however, is a matter of some debate.
In addition to the exogenous rules the system imposes on all lawyers, I
want to suggest there is another incentive that is particularly potent in
encouraging lawyers to strive to take the highest ethical and professional road
available. I am referring to the enormous power produced through the
cultivation of an upright, honorable reputation. A personal story may help
illustrate this point.
When I was in practice, I represented an investment brokerage house
against one of its former clients. The client alleged that the company and her
agent, in particular, had treated her very badly by churning the account. By
this allegation it was meant that the agent (and through the agent, the
company) encouraged her to make many small stock transactions that, on the
whole, benefited the company and the agent more than the individual by
generating commissions through investments that were not always clientappropriate and on which the returns were often sub-par.
One of my main client representatives was the compliance officer for the
company. His job was to oversee all of the investments made by the brokerage
agents on behalf of their clients, in order to ensure that these transactions were
all proper and that everything done was in compliance with the existing
securities laws, rules and regulations. During the pretrial phase of the case, I
worked with this compliance officer to collect and then produce for the other
side all of the documents that the company maintained that were relevant to the
case. After I was satisfied I had done a thorough investigation to locate all
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relevant records, I submitted all of the material that had been gathered to
counsel for the claimant.
Opposing counsel and I disagreed on plenty of occasions throughout the
case. Notwithstanding these differences, we managed to treat each other
decently, courteously and respectfully. In effect, we amicably agreed to
disagree. In this manner, each of us represented our respective clients’
interests zealously, but still acted within the bounds of our professional
obligations to each other.
The day of trial finally arrived. After opening statements, opposing
counsel called their first witness to the stand. By mid-afternoon, several more
witnesses had testified briefly and things appeared to be proceeding slowly, but
surely, forward. Then, just before our afternoon break, opposing counsel
called the company’s compliance officer to the stand. The compliance officer
had only been on the stand for about half an hour or so when the judges
decided to take a brief fifteen-minute break. I never could have predicted what
was to happen next.
Immediately upon the recess being called, the compliance officer
approached me to ask if we could talk in private. For reasons that I do not
think I will ever fully understand, for the first time ever in the case, the
compliance officer confessed that he had withheld documents. As he now told
me, about a month before this lawsuit had been filed, he had taken some files
pertaining to the claimant and put them into his garage.
“Why are you telling me this only now?” I asked, stunned. Silence
followed. “And why did you take them to your garage in the first place?” But
he offered no explanation that made (or makes, even today) any sense.18 In
retrospect, my best guess as to why he decided to come forward at all rather
than remain silent is that this man suddenly found himself jolted into
confession. It was as though his appearance on the stand as a sworn witness
somehow ignited within him a profound sense of ethical torment. Possibly,
this feeling had already been building inside of him for some time, and his
sitting on the witness chair was a final straw, the necessary spark, to cause this
eruption. I do not know for sure, and I suspect I will never know. I certainly
did not know at the time. What I did know was that he was about to return to
the witness stand to continue testifying and I had to do something about this
new information I had just been given.
Returning to the proceedings, I began by explaining I had just been
informed by the witness––literally out in the hallway––that there were
additional documents relating to the claimant at the compliance officer’s home.

18. What surely makes the story stranger still is that when the documents were finally
produced, it turned out that none were particularly probative of the claims being made in this
case, although we had little sense of this at the time he made his abrupt announcement in the
middle of the hearing. What mattered then, of course, was the appearance of impropriety.
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I explained that I had not been told of the existence of these documents before
and that, to my knowledge, no other company official had known about them.
I expressed my commitment to proceed in whatever fashion the court and the
claimant’s lawyer thought best, given the extraordinary circumstances.
I can still recall the silence that followed my short remarks. It was
palpable and tense. After some time, the lawyer representing the claimant
spoke. “I am deeply troubled by this announcement,” he began,
and I beg the Court’s indulgence to consider what is the best approach to take,
under the circumstances. I suspect that an immediate suspension of the trial is
in order so that we be given an opportunity to review these newly-discovered
documents. After we have an opportunity to do so, I will be in a better
position to advise the court on how I think we should proceed.

He then turned and looked directly at me.
I want to add, however, that I do not doubt for a minute that Mr. Hoffman was
as taken aback by this announcement as I have been. Throughout my dealings
with him, I can say without qualification that he has always acted
professionally and with the highest degree of integrity. We have not always
agreed about all things in this case, but I am certain that if he had known about
these missing records beforehand, he would never have kept it secret. I am not
as confident about the integrity of his client, but this should cast no black mark
on his record.

As I reflect on the moral of the story, I am reminded of my childhood little
league experience. I was never a very good baseball player. When I found
myself at bat (which was rare, since that necessitated having me occupy right
field, which I did far less adeptly than occupying the right side of the dugout
bench), I would often shut my eyes just before the pitcher’s release. At times,
I liken the experience of being a lawyer to standing there in the batter’s box,
unprotected and blind. More often than not, we do not see the pitch coming. It
whizzes by, and the hot wind trailing behind sends a surge of adrenaline
through the body, but it is already too late. The collision either has happened
or it has not. Even if we manage to keep our eyes open, unexpected
occurrences in our work, as in life, are inevitable.
One of the lessons I take away from my experience in this case is that we
ought to act honorably not solely because it is the honorable and right thing to
do. We ought to act honorably, as well, precisely because it is not possible to
foresee all difficulties we will face in the future. If this sounds pretextual, it is
not intended in that way. I did not treat my opposing counsel with respect
because I anticipated problems would arise later in the case, and I certainly did
not work at building a reputation as a lawyer whose word could be relied upon
because I thought I might need to cash in down the road. But knowing that
reputation matters––that for a lawyer it is often all that matters––can serve as a
powerful reminder that even if there is no way to insure against all unforeseen
occurrences, it is still prudent to try, in the main, to fortify ourselves in
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advance. We are still going to get hit, of course, though probably not as
frequently, and the resulting damage may often be sustainable.
CONCLUSION
One of my intellectual heroes, Karl Llewellyn, once spoke to his own class
of students at Columbia, exhorting them to rise to the challenges they would
face in law school and beyond:
What I am trying to write in fire on the wall is that the task before you is
immense, is overwhelming, and that the official courses of the school are not
enough to compass it. “TEKEL: thou art weighed in the balance and found
wanting.” To do the work is not: to do the classes. Rather must you immerse
yourself for all your hours in the law. Eat law, talk law, think law, drink law,
babble of law and judgments in your sleep. Pickle yourselves in the law––it is
your only hope.19

The effort required of you is great, but there is no other way around it.
This is how it must be with your education and training. I can provide a
suitable and encouraging forum in which learning can take place. I can create
an environment that is conducive to rigorous thinking and study; but I cannot
do it for you. As Llewellyn put it, “[W]e do not teach––you learn.”20 At the
end of the day, when this course is over, and you have graduated from this
place and entered the world as lawyers, you will be on your own. Still, take
comfort: the work you have done here and the habits you form as students can
carry you a great way. The question is only whether we have provided a
brilliant space in which you may thrive, and whether, then, you will make the
commitment to do so.

19. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 110.
20. Id. at 109.
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